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  14 
Abstract: 15 
Altruism between close relatives can be easily explained. However, paradoxes arise when organisms 16 
divert altruism towards more-distantly-related recipients. In some social insects, workers ‘drift’ 17 
extensively between colonies and help raise less-related foreign brood, seemingly reducing inclusive 18 
fitness. Since being highlighted by W. D. Hamilton, three hypotheses (bet-hedging, indirect reciprocity, 19 
and diminishing returns to cooperation) have been proposed for this surprising behaviour. Here we 20 
show using inclusive fitness theory that bet-hedging and indirect reciprocity could only drive 21 
cooperative drifting under improbable conditions. However, diminishing returns to cooperation create 22 
a simple context in which sharing workers is adaptive. Using a longitudinal dataset comprising over a 23 
quarter of a million nest-cell observations, we quantify cooperative payoffs in the Neotropical wasp 24 
Polistes canadensis, where drifting occurs at high levels. As the worker-to-brood ratio rises in a worker’s 25 
home colony, the predicted marginal benefit of a worker for expected colony productivity diminishes. 26 
Helping on related colonies can allow effort to be focused on related brood that are more in need of 27 
care. Finally, we use simulations to show that cooperative drifting evolves under diminishing returns 28 
when dispersal is local, allowing altruists to focus their efforts on related recipients. Our results indicate 29 
the power of nonlinear fitness effects to shape social organization, and suggest that models of eusocial 30 
evolution should be extended to include neglected social interactions within colony networks. 31 
  32 
Altruism – sacrifice of Darwinian fitness to increase that of a recipient – is easily explained when 33 
occurring between close relatives1, through an increase in the altruist’s inclusive fitness (success at 34 
propagating copies of its genes in the population)2–4. However, paradoxical forms of altruism arise when 35 
individuals divert help from the closest relatives and towards more-distantly-related recipients5,6. This 36 
seemingly irrational behaviour appears to reduce inclusive fitness7. 37 
Social insect colonies are often impenetrable ‘fortresses’8. However, in some (especially primitively-38 
eusocial) species, between-colony movement (‘drifting’) by both workers6,7,9–12 and foundresses13 can 39 
be extensive. Often, opportunities for reproductive parasitism14 or nest inheritance13 provide clear 40 
direct fitness motives. In other cases, drifters lack obvious opportunities for direct fitness7,11,12, and help 41 
more-distant relatives than recipients on their home colony. In some primitively-eusocial Polistes paper 42 
wasps, the extreme extent of drifting by nonreproductive workers has become clear: in the tropics 43 
(where Polistes originated), 56% of workers within a population were detected at multiple colonies12. 44 
Drifting workers perform standard cooperative tasks12 (henceforth, ‘cooperative drifting’), creating 45 
‘extended kin groups’11 (networks of cooperating colonies). However, despite primitively-eusocial 46 
insects being long-standing models for understanding trajectories to complex eusociality15, the adaptive 47 
function of cooperative drifting has not been identified. 48 
Three hypotheses have been proposed to explain the evolution of cooperative drifting by non-49 
reproductive primitively-eusocial workers. The bet-hedging hypothesis12 suggests that helping multiple 50 
related colonies (‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ in Fig. 1a) avoids the risk of investing in a single colony that could 51 
succumb to chance failure or predation. By diversifying investments, workers accept reduced expected 52 
inclusive fitness for the benefit of reduced variance in inclusive fitness. The indirect reciprocity 53 
hypothesis5 suggests that helping in partner colonies (‘2’ in Fig. 1b) leads to other workers (‘3’ in Fig. 54 
1b) – who may be nonrelatives – helping the home colony (‘1’ in Fig. 1b). For this to be beneficial, it is 55 
assumed that help exchanged between neighbours is worth more than help from natal workers due to 56 
‘social heterosis’: a negative relationship between relatedness and ability to improve colony 57 
productivity16. The diminishing returns hypothesis7,12 suggests that the marginal benefit provided by a 58 
worker diminishes as the number of workers tending brood increases17,18 (‘1’ in Fig. 1c), an effect first 59 
highlighted by Michener in 196419, and helping on related colonies allows effort to be redirected 60 
towards brood that are more in need of care (‘2’ in Fig. 1c). There has been no formal comparison of 61 
these hypotheses, so we begin by using inclusive fitness theory to assess the plausibility of each.  62 
 63 
Results 64 
Selection for cooperative drifting 65 
First, we show that, under normal conditions, bet-hedging12 cannot select for cooperative drifting. 66 
We derive an explicit mean-risk trade-off for bet-hedging traits for an organism maximizing its inclusive 67 
fitness3 (Methods 1): 68 
max
𝐪
 {𝐪†𝛍 − 𝑣 ⋅ 𝜌√𝐪†𝐂𝐪} (1) 69 
subject to       𝐪†𝟏 = 1 70 
where the organism must choose the optimal weights (𝐪) to place on different investments, balancing 71 
the expectation (𝐪†𝛍, where † denotes transpose) and variance (𝐪†𝐂𝐪) in absolute inclusive fitness 72 
returns, for particular values of risk-aversion (𝑣) and  the correlation  (𝜌) between the portfolio’s return 73 
and whole-population average reproductive success (?̅?). The vector 𝛍 contains the offspring 74 
production per unit invested (weighted by offspring relatedness), 𝐂 is the variance–covariance matrix 75 
for the investment payoff rates, and 𝟏 is a vector of ones. A ‘risky’ portfolio has high variance. In 76 
Methods 1, we show that the value of risk aversion (𝑣) that maximizes inclusive fitness is the coefficient 77 
of variation in ?̅?. However, under demographic stochasticity – which is generated by random colony 78 
failures – meaningful fluctuations in ?̅? will only occur if the population is extremely small (Methods 1), 79 
so 𝑣 ≈ 0. Moreover, in reasonably sized populations, fluctuations in ?̅? that do happen due to random 80 
colony failure occur independently of fluctuations in the portfolio’s returns, so 𝜌 ≈ 0. Since 𝑣 ≈ 0 (and 81 
𝜌 ≈ 0), the second term of (1) is negligible, so workers should maximise only the expectation of 82 
inclusive fitness (𝐪†𝛍). The same logic underpins why bet-hedging against randomly occurring clutch 83 
failure is an unlikely explanation for birds distributing eggs over multiple nests20 or parasitoids 84 
distributing eggs over multiple hosts21. In summary, the bet-hedging hypothesis for cooperative drifting 85 
is mathematically coherent (Fig. 1d) only in an extremely small population and/or in cases where 86 
drifting would lead to a very small reduction in expected inclusive fitness 𝐪†𝛍, circumstances that only 87 
rarely arise in the natural world. One way, for instance, is if there were near-negligible differences in 88 
relatedness towards brood on home and neighbouring colonies, but Polistes drifters face falls in 89 
relatedness12. 90 
Second, we show that indirect reciprocity5 is unlikely to explain cooperative drifting. Using 91 
simulations, Nonacs5 has argued that drifters will automatically help only at colonies sharing indirect 92 
reciprocator alleles because these are the only colonies willing to accept them. However, there is no 93 
reason to expect pleiotropy between these two behaviours, so (unlike Ref.5) we allow the emission (𝑦) 94 
and acceptance (𝑚) of drifters to evolve independently in a kin-selection model (Methods 2). As in Ref.5,  95 
we find that when 𝑚 is prevented from decreasing whilst 𝑦 increases, drifting can evolve (Methods 2). 96 
But when this unjustified assumption is relaxed, indirect reciprocity collapses due to the invasion of 97 
free-riding: colonies willingly accept foreign workers10 (𝑚 = 1) whilst none of their own workers drift 98 
(𝑦 = 0) (Methods 2; Fig. 1e). 99 
Third, we show that diminishing returns7,12 can be a simple driver of cooperative drifting (Methods 3): 100 
as the effect of helping closely-related recipients declines, diversion of altruism towards more-distantly-101 
related recipients can satisfy Hamilton’s rule (increase in benefit 𝑏 more than compensates for the 102 
decrease in relatedness 𝑟). In a kin-selection model using the framework of Davies et al.22, we let the 103 
probability of brood surviving to maturity (𝐾) be determined by a simple diminishing returns function: 104 
𝐾 = 1 − (1 − ℎ)𝑇, where 0 ≤ ℎ ≤ 1 is help received from workers. Higher values of 𝑇 result in 105 
stronger diminishing returns. Help (ℎ) received by each brood depends on the worker-to-brood ratio 𝜓 106 
in their colony, which may vary stochastically between and within colonies through time. For simplicity, 107 
we consider neighbouring colonies with equal brood numbers, lying at different points on a line of 108 
possible worker-to-brood ratios. Worker-to-brood ratios greater than 𝜓 = 1 occur only on colonies in 109 
terminal decline, so we focus on 0 < 𝜓 ≤ 1.  Drifting reduces a worker’s relatedness to the brood it 110 
cares for to the (nonzero) proportions 𝑑♀ and 𝑑♂ for female and male brood respectively, relative to 111 
raising siblings at home. When a home colony has worker-to-brood ratio 𝜓, selection favours a small 112 
increase in drifting (𝑦) to a colony with a proportion 𝑔 of the home colony’s workforce when the 113 
improvement in indirect fitness from escaping diminishing returns (left-hand side) compensates for 114 
reductions in recipient relatedness (right-hand side): 115 
(1 − 𝜓𝑥(1 − 𝑧)(𝑔 + 𝑦))
𝑇−1





where 𝑥 is the proportion of females that are behaviourally sterile (not reproductive) and 𝑧 is the 117 
proportion of offspring that are male, so 𝑥(1 − 𝑧) is the proportion of offspring that are workers.  118 
To find candidate evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for drifting level 𝑦, we set equal the left and 119 
right sides of Inequality 2 and rearrange for 𝑦. Letting consanguinity to male and female brood be 120 
devalued by the same amount (𝑑♀ = 𝑑♂ = 𝑑), the ESS drifting level 𝑦










] (3) 122 
Given the possibility to drift to related colonies at sufficiently steeper points on an inclusive-fitness-123 
returns curve, workers should tolerate a reduction in recipient relatedness (Methods 3; Fig. 1f; 124 
Extended Data 1,2). The ESS drifting level 𝑦∗ increases whenever a gap in worker payoff increases 125 
between two related colonies: 𝑦∗ increases with higher 𝑇 (Fig. 1f), higher 𝜓 and lower 𝑔, and for 126 
scenarios in which there is a larger workforce (lower 𝑧 and higher 𝑥). For example, a worker may be 127 
twice as related to brood on its home colony as to brood on a partner colony (𝑑 = ½). Assume the 128 
home colony (with 𝜓 = 1) has twice as many workers as the partner colony (𝑔 =  ½). With diminishing 129 
returns factor of 𝑇 = 4, three-quarters of females developing as non-reproductive workers (𝑥 = ¾), 130 
and a sex ratio of 3:1 female eggs to male eggs (𝑧 = ¼), the expected equilibrium level of cooperative 131 
drifting from the home colony would be for 13.2% of worker effort to be divested to the less-related 132 
partner colony (𝑦∗ = 0.132). As workers drift and group sizes consequently change, the marginal 133 
payoff of staying on the home colony rises and the marginal payoff of helping on the partner colony 134 
falls until 𝑦 = 𝑦∗, where any further drifting would reduce inclusive fitness.  135 
 136 
Diminishing payoffs in the wild 137 
To investigate plausible ranges within which diminishing returns to cooperation may exist, we used 138 
longitudinal field tracking of brood development and worker numbers in a Neotropical paper wasp. 139 
Polistes canadensis is a model species in which cooperative drifting is common and can reduce 140 
relatedness to recipient brood considerably (e.g., 𝑟 = 0.56 at home vs 𝑟 = 0.19 on partner colonies)12. 141 
Colonies typically consist of a single queen and behaviourally nonreproductive daughter workers and 142 
non-nestmate drifters12. As workers emerge, colonies can grow in group size from fewer than 10 143 
females to up to 200 females. In dominance hierarchies below the queen, a small number of high-144 
ranking wasps have an opportunity to inherit the nest on the death of the resident queen23; most 145 
subordinates perform helping behaviours (including foraging, nest hygiene, brood inspection, nest 146 
building, and nest defense)12,24,25. The lack of a covering nest envelope allows clear observation of 147 
individual brood (Fig. 2a) and the opportunity to document whole-colony development through time26. 148 
We aimed to assess how a colony’s success at producing new adults is associated with numbers of 149 
workers and brood on the colony. Across 56 days, we made over a quarter-of-a-million observations of 150 
more than 20,000 individually tracked brood cells on 91 wild post-worker-emergence colonies. The 151 
stage of brood development in every cell in each colony was recorded repeatedly (Methods 4; Extended 152 
Data 3) and treated as a state in a Markov model (Fig. 2b,c). The number of adults on the nest at night 153 
(when all workers are present) was counted at intervals over the observation period. This resulted in a 154 
dataset of 123,116 state-transitions involving live brood on 85 colonies in 471 colony-observations for 155 
which worker number can be predicted by interpolation through the night censuses (Methods 4). To 156 
investigate the extent to which there may be variation in payoffs within networks of colonies, we asked 157 
how the number of workers correlated with colony success at different points of larval development. 158 
Using between-colony variation in the number of workers and worker-to-brood ratio, whilst 159 
controlling for within-colony variation and colony state (using the extent of brood-cell emptiness as a 160 
proxy), a Bayesian hierarchical model predicts that colonies with higher worker-to-brood ratios and 161 
worker numbers are associated with higher brood development pace and lower brood death. The 162 
Markov model predicts that the expected time for a single egg-containing brood cell to produce an 163 
adult successfully in colonies with different worker and brood numbers (‘expected mean first passage 164 
time’, eMFPT) declines as more workers tend the brood (Fig. 3a,b; Extended Data 4). Multiplying 165 
1/eMFPT by brood number estimates the expected number of new adults that can be produced per 166 
day (whole-colony productivity), which is highest in colonies with many workers and many brood (Fig. 167 
3c,d). The slope of whole-colony productivity with respect to worker number (Fig. 3e,f) then provides 168 
a prediction of the marginal increase in the daily number of brood successfully raised associated with 169 
each additional worker (i.e., plausibility values for the payoff rate). The ‘payoff’ in Fig. 3e,f represents 170 
an empirical estimate of the benefit 𝑏 in Hamilton’s rule from working on a colony of the given size. An 171 
investment in a partner colony 2 is in the inclusive-fitness interest of a worker from a home colony 1 if 172 
𝑟2𝑏2 > 𝑟1𝑏1.  173 
The difference in the predicted payoff from the model suggests that – within the main parameter 174 
space occupied by colonies – workers are more valuable (lighter colours in Fig. 3e) at colonies with a 175 
relatively ‘understaffed’ workforce faced with large brood-rearing challenges than at colonies with 176 
fewer brood to rear. Future models that consider within-colony dynamics may further explain finer-177 
scale variation in brood development rates (see Extended Data 5–8; SI Table S3). However, the 178 
prediction of variation in plausible payoff rates between colonies with different workforce sizes 179 
suggests a context in which workers can increase indirect fitness by helping at less-closely-related 180 
colonies.  181 
 182 
Scales of competition 183 
To explore the demographic conditions that can sustain cooperative drifting, we use agent-based 184 
haplodiploid simulations (Methods 5) of a large population of monogynous colonies distributed over a 185 
square lattice (where each colony has eight neighbours in a ‘Moore neighbourhood’). To model simple 186 
colony growth, we assume a ‘unit’ is a group of workers (e.g., 10 workers), and let colonies produce a 187 
new unit every three time-steps (e.g., 3 weeks) until reaching a maximum of 10 units. We assume a 188 
saturated environment in which each square on the lattice is occupied by one colony. At each time-189 
step, a randomly chosen 10% of colonies die and are replaced. The foundress of the replacement colony 190 
is drawn either from lottery competition among the local eight colonies in the Moore neighbourhood 191 
(when female philopatry is assumed) or globally from the whole population (when female philopatry is 192 
relaxed). Males compete globally for mating with females in lottery competition. The number of 193 
reproductively-destined offspring that colonies produce is a diminishing-returns function of the helper 194 
effort ℎ on the colony, 1 − (1 − ℎ)𝑇 as above. Colonies with more helpers therefore produce more 195 
reproductively-destined females and males, and so have a greater chance in competition for nest sites 196 
and mating, respectively. We evolve units’ propensity to drift for workers on colonies with more than 197 
five units, and show the results of competition by introducing mutant alleles to resident populations at 198 
an initial frequency of 5%. After 1,000 time-steps, we record the mutant frequency and plot the average 199 
change in frequency over three replicate simulations (Methods 5). 200 
Under linear returns, drifting does not invade, regardless of demography (Fig. 4a-c). We then consider 201 
moderate diminishing returns (𝑇 = 3) under three conditions: female philopatry and altruism directed 202 
at local colonies in the Moore neighbourhood (Fig. 4d); female philopatry and altruism directed at 203 
partner colonies whose queens are parents or daughters of their own queen (Fig. 4e); and female global 204 
dispersal with altruism directed at local colonies in the Moore neighbourhood (Fig. 4f). (Female global 205 
dispersal with altruism directed at the genealogically-close partner colonies is not considered, because 206 
global female dispersal makes these pairings vanishingly rare.) Cooperative drifting can invade only 207 
when we allow female philopatry and kin-directed altruism (Fig. 4e): under this scenario, neighbouring 208 
nests develop genealogical links (spatial kin structure), and – when drifters are shared preferentially 209 
within these links – cooperative drifting occurs at a more local scale than the spatial scale of 210 
competition. Polistes wasps often form colony clusters within wider aggregations of tens to hundreds 211 
of colonies11,12,27, a context in which cooperative drifting can evolve by spatial selection under 212 
diminishing returns. 213 
 214 
Discussion 215 
Established accounts of the evolution of eusociality assume actors must choose either to stay as 216 
helpers or leave as reproductives8,28. Our results suggest that diminishing returns may drive altruists to 217 
diversify their help across recipients: workers in some primitively-eusocial societies may increase 218 
inclusive fitness by providing altruism to recipients beyond their home colony. Under positive kinship, 219 
spatial kin clustering, and diminishing returns17,29, worker investments can evolve to become diffusible 220 
public goods. 221 
Our model predicts the conditions under which we expect cooperative drifting to have evolved 222 
(Equation 2, Fig. 1f). Intuitively, drifting is more likely when there are stronger diminishing returns 223 
(higher 𝑇), a larger difference in workforce between nests (smaller 𝑔), increased total workforce (higher 224 
𝜓), and a greater capacity to target kin (higher 𝑑♀ and 𝑑♂). For simplicity in Equation 2, we assume that 225 
all colonies have the same sex ratio, but between-colony sex-ratio variation suggests an additional 226 
factor: a colony producing mainly brothers has a reduced worker relatedness to the brood, at which 227 
point switching colony may be rational for a worker. In short, drifting offers a simple route to boost 228 
inclusive fitness when neighbouring colonies differ in parameters that determine the value of a worker. 229 
Differences in worker and brood number arise easily among P. canadensis colonies (Fig. 3a), which are 230 
subject to several sources of stochasticity. These include fluctuations in worker number due to the high 231 
attrition rate of foraging workers12, frequent loss of brood to parasitoids, presumed loss of brood due 232 
to disease (based on workers’ hygienic removal of larvae), episodes of queen replacement, and so on. 233 
Fluctuations in brood cohort size translate into fluctuations in workforce size once the brood pupate. 234 
Since Michener19 highlighted diminishing returns in hymenopteran societies in 1964, a number of 235 
studies across ants, bees, and wasps have revealed declines in per-capita productivity with rising group 236 
size (e.g.18,30–33). This so-called ‘reproductivity effect’ has not proved universal (e.g.34–36), but its frequent 237 
occurrence leads to ‘Michener’s paradox’: why do apparently partly-redundant helpers exist26,30? 238 
Previous tests of the reproductivity effect have used snapshots of per-capita productivity. By contrast, 239 
we provide a prediction of plausible ranges for the payoffs of cooperation in a primitively-eusocial insect 240 
using colony dynamics. Diminishing returns exist, but – through cooperative drifting – workers can 241 
mitigate redundancy arising from stochastic variation in worker-to-brood ratios between colonies.   242 
The extent of drifting across primitively-eusocial insects remains to be explored5,12. However, the 243 
relatively high levels of drifting observed in Neotropical species such as P. canadensis contrast with, for 244 
example, the European wasp P. dominula, which also forms dense colony aggregations13 but shows high 245 
aggression towards neighbours. This difference in social organization may be due to differences in the 246 
intensity of diminishing returns (e.g., due to food availability or parasite density). Higher stochastic 247 
predation of workers in some species may undermine workers’ abilities to track need across nests. 248 
Alternatively, drifting may be more likely in the tropics: unlike temperate species in which foundresses 249 
establish nests synchronously in the spring, tropical species often establish nests throughout the year25, 250 
and so nests may be more likely to differ in worker-to-brood ratio. Tropical species may also experience 251 
less uncertainty in neighbour relatedness, since nests are more commonly founded by local dispersal 252 
from parent nests (simulated in Fig. 4e), although kin spatial structure can be reestablished in 253 
temperate species by natal philopatry of spring foundresses37. Direct comparisons between species 254 
with and without cooperative drifting are needed. 255 
Cooperative drifting has also emerged among complex eusocial species. Ant ‘supercolonies’ exist 256 
when nests with multiple queens (polygyny) exchange workers (polydomy)6,38. Supercoloniality results 257 
in remarkably low-relatedness cooperation, and remains a theoretical challenge. The evolution of 258 
supercoloniality is likely to involve informational constraints preventing nepotism6, although some 259 
positive relatedness may be maintained by cryptic kin structure39. Our results are relevant here: the 260 
initial drivers of low-relatedness cooperation are unlikely to have been either bet-hedging by risk-261 
spreading at the expense of the expectation of inclusive fitness (Equation 1; Fig. 1d) or the reciprocity 262 
scenario proposed by Ref.5 (Fig. 1e). In principle, diminishing returns may initially have favoured partial 263 
diversion of altruism to more-distantly-related colonies. However, supercoloniality and primitively-264 
eusocial cooperative drifting are not completely analogous. Supercoloniality may have been a relatively 265 
small step for ants that had already evolved high within-colony polygyny – and consequently reduced 266 
relatedness40 – for other reasons. Unlike primitively-eusocial wasps, the first step to explaining 267 
cooperative drifting in ants is explaining polygyny41. 268 
Manipulating colony networks by adjusting worker-to-brood ratio (𝜓) may offer tests of whether 269 
wasps make strategic adjustments to investments (𝑦). Empirical studies are needed to identify whether 270 
host workers discern cooperative drifters and adjust acceptance thresholds (𝑚) adaptively42,43 271 
according to need. Future theoretical work could assess the tension between selfish and cooperative 272 
drifting in determining the acceptance of foreign workers. Wasps with high resource-holding potential 273 
may exploit the relaxation of nest boundaries to drift for direct fitness (e.g., joining dominance 274 
hierarchies on multiple nests to maximise chance of nest inheritance). Models of the mechanisms 275 
individual workers might use to distribute their effort would be useful, potentially inspired by resource-276 
use models in foraging theory44.  277 
Nonlinear payoffs exert strong effects on social evolution: diminishing returns can limit the tragedy of 278 
the commons45, promote polymorphic equilibria46, and increase sharing in reproductive skew games47. 279 
However, the extent to which diminishing returns shape investment patterns remains little quantified 280 
– despite clear theoretical predictions. A tempting explanation for divestment across recipients is that 281 
actors help different recipients in proportion to relatedness (an idea known as the ‘proportional 282 
altruism’ model48). This argument commits the ‘gamblers’ fallacy’49: instead, it is always best to invest 283 
in the single recipient who carries the highest inclusive fitness returns at any one time50. To explain 284 
altruism towards more-distant relatives, in the 1980s Altmann49, Weigel17, and Schulman and 285 
Rubenstein29 highlighted diminishing returns to investment by a single individual. Here, we have 286 
considered diminishing returns to investment by multiple individuals. In both cases, diminishing returns 287 
provide a simple explanation for helping multiple recipients, which awaits empirical study in many 288 
species. Our results indicate the power of nonlinear fitness effects to shape social organisation, and 289 
suggest that models of eusocial evolution should be extended to include neglected social interactions 290 
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Figure captions 313 
Fig. 1 | Three adaptive hypotheses have been proposed for cooperative drifting. (a) Bet-hedging. (b) 314 
Indirect reciprocity. (c) Diminishing returns. (d) Cooperative drifting is only favoured by bet-hedging 315 
(above dashed line) at extremely small population sizes and when recipients differ only slightly in 316 
relatedness to the actor. Equilibrium divestment levels shown (Methods 1). (e) Cooperative drifting 317 
cannot be explained by the indirect reciprocity hypothesis because free-riders invade (𝑦 → 0, 𝑚 → 1). 318 
Arrows show direction of selection. Black quarter-circle is the global attractor (Methods 2). (f) 319 
Diminishing returns can select for cooperative drifting. Stronger diminishing returns and higher 320 
relatedness favour more cooperative drifting (Methods 3). Relative relatedness is 𝑑 in Equation 3 of 321 
main text. For illustration, we plot equal reductions in relatedness for female and male brood (𝑑♀ =322 
𝑑♂ = 𝑑). 𝜓 = 1; 𝑔 = 0.5; 𝑥 = 0.75; 𝑧 = 0.25.  323 
Fig. 2 | Brood development in the Neotropical paper wasp Polistes canadensis. (a) P. canadensis 324 
colonies allow easy observation of individual brood cells. Photograph: PK. (b) Wasp development 325 
involves states from egg (state 1) through larvae (2 to 6) to pupa (7) and finally a new adult (definitions 326 
of states in Extended Data 3). This can be represented using a Markov model. (c) Baseline transition 327 
probabilities between developmental states using an intercepts-only model (Methods 4). In using 328 
developmental rates to produce a measure of colony productivity as a function of worker behaviour, 329 
we set transitions to death as transitions back to egg (state 1), in order to exclude confounding effects 330 
from between-queen variation in egg-laying rates. 331 
Fig. 3 | Brood-rearing rates in Polistes canadensis. (a) Expected number of days for an idealised brood 332 
cell successfully to produce an adult (‘expected mean first passage time’, eMFPT) predicted by 333 
between-colony effects. Brood size denotes number of prepupal brood (states 1–6). Worker group 334 
size denotes interpolated group size using night-time censuses. White dots denote colony 335 
observations. To illustrate predictions in the main parameter space, we generated the prediction of 336 
eMFPT for 1,000 simulated colonies inside the convex hull set by those colony observations with up 337 
to 150 workers and over 40 brood (only 10 colony observations, from six colonies, in the dataset of 338 
471 colony observations used to generate the model, lie outside this range). (b) 95% credible intervals 339 
corresponding to a. (c) Predicted whole-colony productivity (daily expected number of new adults, 340 
given the eMFPT values) is highest in colonies with many workers and many brood. (d) 95% credible 341 
intervals corresponding to c. (e) Slope of predicted whole-colony productivity with respect to worker 342 
group size, representing predicted effect of adding a new worker (the ‘payoff’ provided to the 343 
recipients), an empirical estimate of the potential benefit 𝑏 in Hamilton’s rule. (f) 95% credible 344 
intervals corresponding to e. See Methods 4. 345 
Fig. 4 | Evolution of cooperative drifting in a spatially explicit social haplodiploid simulation. Results of 346 
competition from agent-based simulations of the invasion of drifting. Red denotes mutants invading 347 
from a starting frequency (𝑝initial) of 5% of the population; blue denotes mutants declining. White 348 
denotes negligible change in frequency. Convergence-stable strategies are marked by asterisks. 349 
Conditions were (a–c) no diminishing returns, 𝑇 =  1, and (d–f) moderate diminishing returns, 𝑇 =350 
 3; (a, d) female philopatry and altruism directed at local colonies in the Moore neighbourhood, (b, e) 351 
female philopatry and altruism directed at partner colonies with queens who are parents or daughters 352 
of their own queen, (c, f) global female dispersal with altruism directed at local colonies in the Moore 353 
neighbourhood. Nonlinear returns drive inter-colony cooperation only under both local female 354 
dispersal and kin-directed altruism (panel e). 355 
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  480 
Methods 481 
Tables of notation and supplementary detail on models are available in the Supplementary Information, 482 
and supplementary figures are provided in the Extended Data. 483 
1. Bet-hedging 484 
We consider when an inclusive fitness maximising actor should divide its investments between separate 485 
recipients to minimise the risk that its investments will be lost12. Notation is summarized in Table S1 (see 486 
Supplementary Information). Following Grafen3, we start with the Price equation under uncertainty and 487 
treat the target of selection as an individual maximand. The expected change in allele frequency due to 488 
selection Δ?̅? – where average reproductive success for the population is ?̅?, and 𝐼𝑖 is absolute inclusive 489 
fitness  –   is equal to the covariance over individuals 𝑖 between the expectation of relative inclusive fitness 490 
𝐼𝑖
?̅?
 and the individual’s genotype 𝐺𝑖  491 
𝔼𝜔[Δ?̅?] = Cov𝑖 (𝐺𝑖, 𝔼𝜔 [
𝐼𝑖
?̅?
]) (1.1) 492 
 where expectations 𝔼 are taken across possible states of the population 𝜔 ∈ Ω that may occur. The 493 
absolute inclusive fitness is the sum of all effects 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡 of actor 𝑖 on the absolute fitness of recipient 𝑗 494 
(including the actor itself) across each role 𝑡 (i.e., 𝐼𝑖 = ∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗 ). For derivation of Equation 1.1, see the 495 
first term on the right-hand side of Eq. 6 in Grafen3. Under fitness additivity and frequency-independence, 496 
the quantity 𝔼𝜔 [
𝐼𝑖
?̅?
] is considered to represent a maximand of organismal behaviour3: it is a target of 497 
selection (as it covaries with genotype) that is under the control of the actor since 𝐼𝑖 is composed of the 498 
effects of the actor’s behaviours.  499 
The expectation of a ratio of random variables can be approximated by the Taylor series expansion. The 500 
Taylor series is an acceptable approximation when ?̅? does not rise to greater that 2𝔼𝜔[?̅?]51. We expand 501 










𝜌𝜎𝜔[𝐼𝑖]) (1.2) 503 
where 𝜎𝜔[⋅] denotes standard deviation over the states 𝜔 ∈ Ω, and 𝜌 denotes the correlation between 𝐼𝑖 504 
and ?̅?. The division by 𝔼𝜔[?̅?] does not affect the optimal decision, and so we focus on the terms in the 505 
brackets. 506 
To make more explicit the quantity under a focal organism’s control, we can describe as 𝐪 the vector of 507 
investment weights (the proportions of its total resource) that the individual chooses to place on different 508 
investments that affect the reproductive success of itself and other individuals. The expectation of the focal 509 
individual’s absolute inclusive fitness (𝔼𝜔[𝐼𝑖]) is given by 𝐪
†𝛍, where 𝛍 is the vector of expected inclusive 510 
fitness payoffs from the different potential options (the expectation over the different states 𝜔 ∈ Ω). By 511 
convention, † denotes transpose. Likewise, the standard deviation of a focal individual’s absolute inclusive 512 
fitness appearing in Equation 1.2 (𝜎𝜔[𝐼𝑖]) is given by √𝐪
†𝐂𝐪, where 𝐂 is the variance-covariance matrix of 513 
the payoffs over the states 𝜔 ∈ Ω, and 𝐪†𝐂𝐪 gives the variance (over the states 𝜔 ∈ Ω) of the individual’s 514 
absolute inclusive fitness.  515 




 {𝐪†𝛍 − 𝑣 ⋅ 𝜌 ⋅ √𝐪†𝐂𝐪} (1.3) 518 
where the sum of 𝐪 is one. The coefficient of variation in population average reproductive success (𝑣) is 519 
not affected by the organism’s choice of 𝐪. Whereas in economics, individuals have subjective risk 520 
aversions, ‘risk aversion’ in biology is imposed by the environment: a higher 𝑣 makes individuals more 521 
averse to having an inclusive fitness investment portfolio that has correlated fluctuations with population 522 
average reproductive success. An environment can have high 𝑣 or low 𝑣, and this is imposed on the 523 
organism. The bet-hedging hypothesis implies that an optimisation trade-off exists within 𝐪, balancing the 524 
expectation and the variance in inclusive fitness profit (measured in the absolute number of offspring-525 
equivalents produced).  526 
Equation 1.4 highlights that variance in inclusive fitness (𝐪†𝐂𝐪) only matters when the level of stochasticity 527 
𝑣 (i.e., the coefficient of variation in population average reproductive success ?̅?) and the correlation 𝜌 are 528 
non-negligible. This is generally only true when there is environmental stochasticity that makes a genotype’s 529 
total reproductive success fluctuate in a correlated fashion between environmental states. For instance, 530 
there may be some distinct environmental states when one type of colony does worse, such as big colonies 531 
fail when there is a drought. However, this would require a genotype starting from a position of 532 
overinvesting workers in one type of colony, such that it may then be able to reduce its variance by diverting 533 
some effort towards a different type of colony that doesn’t fail in that environmental state.  534 
The bet-hedging hypothesis proposed by Sumner et al.12 is based on hedging against individual risks to 535 
colonies: demographic stochasticity. In general, demographic stochasticity can only generate meaningful 536 
fluctuations in ?̅? when population (or deme) size is very small53,54. Next, we illustrate the effect of 537 
population size, which we then plot in Fig. 1d of the main text. 538 
To illustrate the bet-hedging hypothesis in a specific example, we switch to a neighbour-modulated 539 
perspective55. Notation is summarised in Table S2. We focus on the effects experienced by recipients due 540 




of an actor 𝑖, we focus on the expected relative fitness 𝔼𝜔 [
𝑤𝑗
?̅?
] of a recipient 𝑗. The Taylor approximation 542 
allows us to write the condition for selection of a trait of interest in a population undergoing pure 543 







)) > 0 545 
∴ Cov𝑗 (𝐺𝑗, 𝔼𝜔[𝑤𝑗] −
Var𝜔[𝑤𝑗]
𝑁𝔼𝜔[?̅?]
) > 0 (1.4) 546 





We consider the following scenario. Workers invest in colony reproductive success (where 𝑤𝑗 is the 548 
reproductive success of the colony’s queen) with linear returns 𝑤𝑗 = 𝐴𝑛𝑗, where 𝑛𝑗 is the number of 549 
workers helping at queen 𝑗’s colony and 𝐴 is a constant. After this investment period, queens are exposed 550 
to random catastrophe (such as a predation of the nest) with independent probability 𝜃 which reduces their 551 
reproductive success to a proportion 𝑘 of its value. Workers must decide during the investment period 552 
whether to invest solely in their home colony, where the queen is the closest related queen, or divest some 553 
of their investment to neighbour colonies.  554 
We assume that there are two sizes of colony with equal numbers of brood: colony type 1 and colony 555 
type 2. Type 1 and type 2 colonies have a high (𝑛1) and low (𝑛2, where 0 <  𝑛2  < 𝑛1) number of workers, 556 
respectively. For each genotype we let half the colonies be type 1 and half be type 2, and pair each type 1 557 
colony with a type 2 colony. For simplicity, we assume a haploid asexual population (i.e., workers share 558 
their queen’s allele for the trait of interest). We ask whether workers on a type 1 colony should divest part 559 
of their investments to a type 2 colony in order to hedge against the risk of their investments on the home 560 
nest being lost to random colony failure. If workers divest from a type 1 colony, they are paired with a 561 
foreign queen on a type 2 colony identical at the focal locus with probability 𝛼 or a random queen (who 562 
may or may not be identical at the focal locus) on a type 2 colony with probability 1 − 𝛼. A mutant worker 563 
from a type 1 colony with divestment level 𝑦 will expend a proportion 𝑦 of its effort on the neighbouring 564 
type 2 colony and a proportion 1 − 𝑦 on its own colony. We assume a population monomorphic for a 565 
resident strategy ?̅?. 566 
The absolute fitness 𝑤2 of a queen on an 𝑛2 colony carrying a mutant allele 𝑦 if no catastrophe occurs is: 567 
𝑤2 = 𝐴{𝑛2 + 𝑛1(𝛼𝑦 + (1 − 𝛼)[𝑃𝑦 + (1 − 𝑃)?̅?])} (1.5) 568 
where 𝑃 is the frequency of mutant allele in the population. The absolute fitness 𝑤1 of a queen on an 𝑛1 569 
colony carrying the mutant allele is as follows if no catastrophe occurs: 570 
𝑤1 = 𝐴𝑛1(1 − 𝑦) (1.6) 571 
There are then four outcomes for any given queen: 572 
 Starts with few workers (𝑛2) Starts with many workers (𝑛1) 
No catastrophe occurs 𝑤2 𝑤1 
Catastrophe occurs 𝑘𝑤2 𝑘𝑤1 
 573 
The probability of each outcome is: 574 
 Starts with few workers (𝑛2) Starts with many workers (𝑛1) 
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((1 − 𝜃)((𝑤2 − 𝔼𝜔[𝑤])
2 + (𝑤1 − 𝔼𝜔[𝑤])
2) + 𝜃((𝑘𝑤2 − 𝔼𝜔[𝑤])







(𝑤1 + 𝑤2) +
𝜃
2
𝑘(𝑤1 + 𝑤2) (1.8) 579 
To ask if a small increase in the level of altruism divested to relatives (𝑦 − ?̅?) can invade, we evaluate the 580 
derivative of the approximation of expected relative fitness (which covaries with genetic value in Equation 581 








= 0 (1.9) 583 
As 𝑦∗ is too complex to give intuition, we plot 𝑦∗ for a range of population sizes (𝑁) and differences in 584 
relatedness between the home and partner colony in Fig. 1d of the main text (i.e., when ‘relative relatedness’ 585 
is one, there is no difference between a worker’s relatedness to the home colony and the partner colony). 586 
The region in which divestment to multiple relatives is favoured is very narrow.  587 
 588 
2. Indirect reciprocity 589 
In this section and the diminishing returns section below, we apply the Taylor-Frank method55 to a 590 
haplodiploid population, using the framework of Davies et al.22, where 𝑥 is level of altruistic sterility, 𝑧 is 591 
the sex ratio (proportion male), 𝑦 is probability of drifting, and 𝑚 is probability of accepting incoming 592 
drifters. An overview and further detail is given in Section 2 of the Supplementary Information, with 593 
notation in Table S1 and the consanguinity values for haplodiploids in Table S2.  594 
We model the indirect reciprocity hypothesis for drifting between unrelated colonies proposed by Ref.5 595 
in a haplodiploid population. Ref.5 argues that a colony’s ‘willingness to accept drifters’ (𝑚) is an honest signal 596 
of its cooperative willingness to emit drifters, allowing the evolution of drifting in the absence of 597 
genealogical kinship. We follow Nonacs5 in letting 𝑚 be the ‘tag’ used passively to determine whether to 598 
drift to a target colony: if the colony will let the worker in, it enters. Accordingly, we look for evolutionarily 599 
stable strategy, 𝑦∗ and 𝑚∗.  600 
We randomly match each colony with a local unrelated recipient colony. Capital letters denote the mean 601 
value of the trait in a social group. We assume that the probability with which females develop as sterile 602 
helpers is the same on all colonies (𝑥). The following events occur: 603 
1. Of helper females on a focal (‘home’) colony, a proportion 𝑌f will be emitted to a recipient colony 604 
as drifters (i.e., 𝑌f is the mean value of the drifting trait in the home colony). Of these, a proportion 605 
𝑀r are on average accepted (since 𝑀r is the average level of willingness to accept drifters among 606 
members of the recipient colony that receives drifters from the focal colony). Any workers that 607 
attempt to drift but are rejected by the neighbour colony return to their home colony and work 608 
there. 609 
2. Of helper females on a donor colony to the ‘home’ colony, a proportion 𝑌d will be emitted to the 610 
home colony as drifters. Of these, a proportion 𝑀f are accepted. 611 
To include ‘social heterosis’, we let help have the effect 𝑢 on an unrelated partner colony and the effect 612 
𝑎 on the home colony. When 𝑢 > 𝑎, workers can make a bigger contribution on an unrelated partner 613 
colony (having unrelated genotypes in the workforce amplifies productivity). When 𝑢 < 𝑎, workers can 614 
make a bigger contribution on their own home colony (having unrelated genotypes in the workforce impairs 615 
productivity). 616 
Brood developing on the home colony receive ℎ units of help: 617 
ℎ = [𝑎(1 − 𝑀r𝑌f) + 𝑢𝑀f𝑌d]𝑥 (2.1) 618 
In this section, we assume linear returns to cooperation, such that 𝐾 = ℎ, where 𝐾 is a brood member’s 619 
probability of successfully developing and ℎ is the help received during its development (see 620 
Supplementary Information for table of notation). 621 
In Case A, we show that the result of Ref.5 can be recovered in the improbable scenario where workers 622 
that accept incoming drifters are unable to stop themselves from drifting in turn. In Case B, we show that 623 
cooperative drifting does not invade when this constraint is removed. 624 
2.1 Case A: Constrained pleiotropy between emission and acceptance of drifters 625 
Here, we force 𝑚 and 𝑦 into pleiotropy, so that an increase in the trait value of one is accompanied by an 626 
increase in the trait value of the other. We assume 𝑀f = 𝛽𝑌f, 𝑀r = 𝛽𝑌r, and ?̅? = 𝛽?̅?, where 𝛽 is a constant 627 
(𝛽 > 0). Substituted into Equation 2.1: 628 
ℎ = [𝑎(1 − 𝛽𝑌r𝑌f) + 𝑢𝛽𝑌f𝑌d]𝑥 (2.2) 629 
In the Supplementary Information, we provide the background to the relative fitness functions. The 630 
relative fitness of both male and female brood is: 631 
𝑊♂ = 𝑊♀ =
𝑥
?̅?
(𝛽𝑢𝑌f𝑌d + 𝑎(1 − 𝛽𝑌r𝑌f)) (2.3) 632 
In the absence of kinship between colonies (as assumed by Ref.5), selection favours a small increase in 633 
drifting 𝑦 when it increases the fitness of the home brood (sisters and brothers on the home colony), which 634 







𝑝bro > 0 (2.4) 636 
where 𝑐♀ is the class reproductive value for females, which for haplodiploids is 
2
3
, and 𝑐♂ is the class 637 
reproductive value for males, which for haplodiploids is 
1
3
. The terms 𝑝sis and 𝑝bro are haplodiploid 638 






. Evaluating with both 𝑌f and 𝑌r at 639 
the population average drifting level ?̅?, the effect on the fitness of female and male brood in the home nest 640 














Substituting the relevant consanguinities (𝑝sis and 𝑝bro) and Equation 2.5 into the condition for selection 643 








 has a positive real value, drifting is favoured in this scenario if: 646 
𝑢 > 𝑎 (2.7) 647 
Accordingly, cooperative drifting can invade under the hypothesis proposed by Ref.5 when increasing the 648 
emission of drifters (𝑦 > 0) to non-relatives is the unavoidable price of increasing the acceptance of drifters 649 
(𝑚 > 0) from non-relatives. Due to a constraint forcing pleiotropy between the traits (𝛽), it is worth paying 650 
the price of losing home workers when the incoming non-relatives increase the colony’s productivity more 651 
than home workers (through social heterosis, 𝑢 > 𝑎).  652 
2.2 Case B: Absence of pleiotropy between emission and acceptance of drifters 653 
We now remove the assumption of pleiotropy, so that 𝑚 and 𝑦 are treated independently. Again assuming 654 
that drifters would be unrelated to brood they care for on partner nests as in Ref.5, the condition for 655 
selection to favour a small increase in drifting is the same as Equation 2.4. The relative fitness of male and 656 
female brood is now: 657 
𝑊♂ = 𝑊♀ =
𝑥
?̅?
(𝑀f𝑢𝑌d + 𝑎(1 − 𝑀r𝑌f)) (2.8) 658 
Evaluating again with both 𝑌f and 𝑌r at the population average drifting level ?̅?, and with 𝑀𝑓 and 𝑀𝑟 at 659 
the population average acceptance level ?̅?, the effect on the fitness of female and male brood in the home 660 














As long as a recipient colony does not reject incoming drifters (?̅? > 0), a small increase in drifting by 663 
workers leads to a loss in relative fitness for their sibling brood. Again substituting the relevant 664 









 has a positive real value, drifting is favoured if: 668 
𝑎 < 0 (2.11) 669 
 That is, if home workers are actively deleterious to the home colony’s productivity. Thus if workers 670 
provide any benefit to their home colony (𝑎 > 0), they should not be emitted as drifters to unrelated 671 
colonies.  672 







𝑝bro > 0 (2.12) 674 
A small increase by workers in acceptance to the home nest of incoming drifters increases the relative 675 


















> 0 (2.14) 679 
Assuming incoming drifters would contribute positively to productivity (𝑢 > 0), 
𝑢𝑥
3?̅?
 has a positive real 680 
value, and acceptance is favoured if: 681 
?̅? > 0 (2.15) 682 
Selection favours acceptance (𝑚 > 0) whenever drifters are being emitted by other colonies (?̅? > 0). 683 
Whilst selection favours the minimisation of drifting to unrelated colonies in all circumstances in which 684 
workers are helpful (Equation 2.15), it favours maximum acceptance 𝑚 of foreign cooperative drifters (i.e., 685 
free-riding) (Equation 2.11). Accordingly, willingness to accept drifters (higher 𝑚) is not an honest signal 686 
of willingness to emit drifters (higher 𝑦). In the absence of complex and implausible social insect colony 687 
versions of the stabilising mechanisms known to sustain indirect reciprocity (including between-colony 688 
monitoring of whole-colony reputation, uncheatable physical greenbeards, or punishment of free-riding 689 
colonies by cooperative colonies), the proposed effect of indirect reciprocity5 cannot drive drifting. We plot 690 
the direction of selection in Fig. 1e of the main text. 691 
Finally, we note that in principle ‘social heterosis’ (𝑢 > 𝑎) between related nests could drive drifting by kin 692 
selection, rather than by indirect reciprocity: a large benefit that could be provided to distant kin would 693 
compensate for their more distant relatedness, and so satisfy Hamilton’s rule. However, this would require 694 
acutely strong social heterosis at levels unknown in any social insect: high synergies between genotypes 695 
would need to ensure that halving relatedness to recipients would more than double the benefit a worker 696 
can provide. 697 
 698 
3. Diminishing returns 699 
We consider a situation in which colonies differ in their worker-to-brood ratio 𝜓, in the range 0 < 𝜓 ≤700 
1. For simplicity, we consider neighbour colonies with equal absolute brood numbers. Variation in worker-701 
to-brood ratio can arise for any reason. For instance, Polistes canadensis colonies show considerable variation 702 
in worker number for a given brood size (as shown in the horizontal range of the scatter-points of Fig. 3 703 
in the main text), often through chance worker mortality (estimated at 7% per day12). We ask when workers 704 
on a home colony with 𝜓 should invest in a partner colony that has a proportion 𝑔 < 1 of worker-to-705 
brood ratio of the home colony. The diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that workers should not invest 706 
in other colonies, despite 𝜓 variation, when the returns from cooperation are linear: the increment in the 707 
payoffs of altruism is the same regardless of 𝜓. When there are diminishing returns to cooperation, 708 
however, a worker on a home colony with high 𝜓 may experience weaker indirect fitness returns on its 709 
home colony than on a neighbour colony. 710 
We assume that 𝜓 variation between colonies occurs unpredictably from the perspective of an individual. 711 
Accordingly, wasps are blind to their colony type when deciding whether to pursue altruistic sterility (worker 712 
phenotype) or reproduction. Let the sex ratio (𝑧) and proportion of females that are sterile altruists (𝑥) be 713 
common to all nests. We assume that the partner colony will emit no drifters and ask what the equilibrium 714 
level of drifting will be from the home colony to the partner colony. The average level of drifting 𝑦 from 715 
the home colony to the partner colony is 𝑌. Both 𝑦 and 𝑌 are evaluated at population average value ?̅?. 716 
We consider the extent of drifting that should evolve between two types of nest (‘1’ and ‘2’), which differ 717 
in their worker-to-brood ratio (𝜓). Using the framework of Davies et al.22 (described in the Supplementary 718 
Information), we let the absolute fitnesses of focal female brood on the home type 1 colony (subscript ‘1’) 719 
and the partner type 2 colony (subscript ‘2’) respectively be: 720 
𝑤♀,1 = (1 − 𝑥)𝐾1 (3.1) 721 
𝑤♀,2 = (1 − 𝑥)𝐾2 (3.2) 722 
The rate of producing reproductives on a home colony of type 𝑠 is 𝐾𝑠 = 1 − (1 − ℎ𝑠)
𝑇 (see 723 
Supplementary Information for details). The total help received by brood on each colony type is: 724 
ℎ1 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑧)𝜓(1 − 𝑌) (3.3) 725 
ℎ2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑧)𝜓(𝑔 + 𝑌) (3.4) 726 
The population average levels of help on colonies of each type in the population: 727 
ℎ̅1 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑧)𝜓(1 −  ?̅?) (3.5) 728 
ℎ̅2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑧)𝜓(𝑔 + ?̅?) (3.6) 729 
The population average relative fitnesses on each nest type, for both male and female brood, assuming 730 
colony types 1 and 2 are equally frequent in the population, are (Supplementary Information): 731 








where ?̅?𝑠 is the population average value of 𝐾𝑠 for colonies of type 𝑠. 734 
As above (Equation 2.4), let 𝑐♀ be the class reproductive value for females (
2
3
). Let 𝑐♂ be the class 735 
reproductive value for males (
1
3
). Selection favours an increase in cooperative drifting from nest type 1 to 736 
nest type 2 (𝑦) when the net effect on all potentially-affected parties (sisters, brothers, partner-colony female 737 
brood, and partner-colony male brood) leads to an expected increase in the success of a mutant allele for 738 
drifting (we assume no effect on self fitness, since drifters are already committed to being behaviourally-739 













𝑑♂𝑝bro) > 0 (3.9) 741 
with traits evaluated at their population average values (𝑦 = 𝑌 = ?̅?), and where 𝑑♀ is the devaluation in 742 
consanguinity to female brood on the partner colony (relative to sisters on the home colony) and 𝑑♂ is the 743 
devaluation in consanguinity to male brood on the partner colony (relative to brothers on the home colony). 744 
Although we are focusing on scenarios in which a worker’s consanguinity to brood is lower on the partner 745 
colony than on the home colony, and hence ‘devalued’ (𝑑♀, 𝑑♂ < 1), there can also be scenarios in which 746 
a worker is more consanguineous with brood on the partner colony, which may only apply to one sex. For 747 
instance, nephews are more consanguineous to a female than brothers are (𝑝nephew= 
3
8
 but 𝑝bro =
1
4
). If 748 
the partner-colony male brood are nephews, 𝑑♂ would be greater than 1. If the partner-colony female 749 
brood are nieces, 𝑑♀ remains below 1 (since 𝑝niece =
3
16
 but 𝑝sis =
3
8
).  750 
A small increase in drifting (𝑌) by workers from the home type 1 nest leads to a loss of relative fitness for 751 











2𝜓𝑇𝑥(1 − 𝑧)(1 − 𝜓𝑥(1 − 𝑧)(1 − ?̅?))
𝑇−1
 ?̅?1 + ?̅?2
(3.10) 753 
A small increase in drifting (𝑌) by workers from the home type 1 nest leads to an increase in relative 754 















Substituting Equations 3.10 and 3.11 into Inequality 3.9, and dividing both sides by 
𝜓𝑇𝑥(1−𝑧)
6(?̅?1+?̅?2)
, gives the 757 
condition for selection to favour a small increase in drifting: 758 
(1 − 𝜓𝑥(1 − 𝑧)(𝑔 + 𝑦))
𝑇−1





which is Inequality 2 in the main text.  760 
To find candidate evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for drifting (𝑦∗), we set the left and right sides of 761 






































which is Equation 3 in the main text (where, for simplicity , we assume that consanguinity to male and 764 
female brood is devalued by the same proportion; 𝑑♀ = 𝑑♂ = 𝑑). Higher levels of relatedness (higher 𝑑♀ 765 
and 𝑑♂) and stronger diminishing returns (higher 𝑇) select for higher levels of drifting 𝑦
∗ at equilibrium 766 
(Extended Data 1). We plot the equilibria at illustrative values in Fig. 2f of the main text. In Extended 767 
Data 2, we plot the candidate equilibria at different values of sex ratio 𝑧 and female helping 𝑥. 768 
 769 
4. Polistes canadensis payoffs 770 
To obtain empirical measures of productivity in Polistes canadensis, we tracked a cohort of developing brood 771 
on 91 free-living post-emergence colonies over a 56-day period (from 14th June to 8th August 2016). 772 
Colonies were clustered in six aggregations on the north coast of Panama (15.2 ± 7.7 colonies per 773 
aggregation, mean ± S.D.). Five aggregations were in clearings between lowland tropical forest and the 774 
Panama Canal (former US Army Base Fort Sherman, San Lorenzo National Park, Colón Province) and one 775 
aggregation was in a clearing in a mangrove swamp (Galeta Point, Colón Province). We use an observational 776 
approach to quantify productivity. Key parameters of brood-rearing can be quantified effectively in 777 
unmanipulated colonies, including natural rates of stochastic failure, predation, parasitism, queen turnover, 778 
workforce fluctuations, and male production. Associations between brood transition rates and workforce 779 
size are correlational, and so we view our results as plausible ranges within which causal effects can exist. 780 
To measure the impact of workers at different developmental states, we split brood into stereotypical 781 
categories in a sequence. Each category, and its notation, is listed in Extended Data 3. We examined each 782 
brood cell at 5-day intervals, using a ladder to access colonies and a flashlight to illuminate each cell. A small 783 
number of observations were made on the following morning due to issues with field site access. The 784 
current classification of the brood cell was dictated to a second observer, who recorded it on a hexagonal 785 
grid of the nest. Accordingly, brood classification was done by a single observer blind to the previous state 786 
of the cell. 787 
We censused adult group size by recording total adult numbers at night (8 pm–11 pm, 6–7 censuses per 788 
colony across the monitoring period). We used a red light (which wasps are unable to see) to avoid 789 
disturbance. Nests that were difficult to observe were counted multiply on a given night and averages taken. 790 
A small number of males emerged and stayed on nests. Adult males observed in daylight surveys during the 791 
brood counts on 5-day intervals were used to interpolate male number through time; otherwise, males were 792 
assumed to be absent. Female number (henceforth, ‘group size’) during each 5-day interval was defined as 793 
interpolated total number of adults minus interpolated male number. We assumed that any changes in group 794 
size between night-censuses occur gradually without sudden jumps, to avoid imposing artificial step changes 795 
in the model. We therefore estimated group size during each interval as the mean (across 5 days) of the 796 
fitted group sizes generate by a cubic spline interpolation through the night-censuses. For 5-day brood-797 
observation intervals in which the first night census occurred within 1 day of the beginning of the interval, 798 
we allowed a limited extrapolation of 1 day in order to approximate mean group size over the 5-day interval. 799 
All intervals that would require any other extrapolation of group size were excluded from the analysis below 800 
in which group size is used as a predictor. To obtain estimates of the payoff rates, we fit a Markov model 801 
(shown in Fig. 3) to the brood development data, asking how colony productivity changes in association 802 
with different worker and brood numbers.  803 
4.1 Statistical methods  804 
The (relatedness-weighted) marginal effect of a worker on the development time of a larva is an 805 
incomplete measure of indirect fitness payoff. This is because Polistes nests experience considerable 806 
individual brood death12, which returns the cell to the start of the developmental process (once the queen 807 
has redeposited an egg). A worker’s major contribution might be to prevent inefficiency by minimising the 808 
rate of brood death. To accommodate both effects, we therefore analysed brood development as a Markov 809 
model, where the target parameter for inference is the expected time for a brood cell to produce a new 810 
adult (‘time to absorption’ of the Markov model57) . The cell may cycle through repeat deaths before finally 811 
producing an adult. We treated the Markov transition matrix as a function of the predictor variables worker 812 
number, worker-to-brood ratio, brood-cell emptiness, and interactions. To estimate the transition matrix, 813 
we used Bayesian mixed models with colony as a random effect. Using the resulting estimate of the ‘time 814 
to absorption’ for P. canadensis colonies of different worker and brood sizes, we then obtained the predicted 815 
colony productivity rate, defined as the expected number of new adults produced per unit time. Because 816 
we are interested in the marginal effect of each additional worker on brood production, we took as an 817 
estimate of Hamiltonian benefit 𝐵 the partial derivative of this rate with respect to worker number, 818 
evaluated at the point in demographic parameter space characterising any focal colony. 819 
In principle, workers absconding due to a colony entering the declining phase and productivity falling 820 
might generate the appearance of a decline in worker number causing a decline in productivity, whilst in 821 
reality the decline in productivity caused the decline in worker number. To mitigate this as far as is possible, 822 
we include brood-cell emptiness as a measure of colony state and allow for its interactions.  823 
Because (1) brood states are categorical and (2) longitudinal data were collected in discrete time steps, we 824 
give a multinomial likelihood for the number of transitions observed from each development state 𝑖 into 825 
each state 𝑗 , which provides information on the probability 𝜋𝑖𝑗 of a brood transition from developmental 826 
state 𝑖 to state 𝑗. We model the number of transitions 𝜙𝑖→𝑗 (defined over a 5-day interval) where the self-827 
transition 𝑖 → 𝑖  provides the reference category (𝜙𝑖→𝑖 = 1) and all other transitions are described by log-828 
linear functions of the predictors 𝑥𝑝 in the vector 𝐱 (i.e., ln(𝜙𝑖→(𝑗≠𝑖)) = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛃𝑖𝑗,𝑝 ⋅ 𝐱𝑝): 829 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 =
𝜙𝑖→𝑗









The predictors include random effects for colony ID (defined below, Equation 4.3). The 𝜙𝑖→𝑗 transitions 831 











1 𝜙1→2 𝜙1→3 𝜙1→4 𝜙1→5 − − − 𝜙1→9
− 1 𝜙2→3 𝜙2→4 𝜙2→5 𝜙2→6 − − 𝜙2→9
− − 1 𝜙3→4 𝜙3→5 𝜙3→6 − − 𝜙3→9
− − − 1 𝜙4→5 𝜙4→6 − − 𝜙4→9
− − − − 1 𝜙5→6 𝜙5→7 − 𝜙5→9
− − − − − 1 𝜙6→7 − 𝜙6→9
− − − − − − 1 𝜙7→8 𝜙7→9
− − − − − − − 1 −










State 1 is egg, states 2-6 are larval states, state 7 is pupa, state 8 is adult (successful pupation), and state 9 834 
is death during development. The final two rows, adulthood (8) and death (9), are absorbing. 835 
The model is solved in discrete time because brood were observed at intervals. Accordingly, brood are 836 
free to transition from one state to a state further downstream than the next step in the sequence; they have 837 
passed through the transitional states during the 5-day window. Some transitions are not biologically 838 
possible during a 5-day window (such as 1 to 6 or 3 to 7), so are not permitted in the Markov transition 839 
matrix (represented by a dash). We present two models with increasing complexity. ‘Model 1’ focuses on 840 
the baseline transition rates (i.e., intercepts and random effects only) for the complete dataset of observed 841 
transitions between live-brood-containing cells, which allows us to estimate the baseline productivity rate 842 
of P. canadensis colonies (Fig. 2c of the main text).  843 
Next, we present an indicator-variable-selection model (‘Model 2’) to identify the marginal change in 844 
productivity associated with each additional worker at different points in the parameter space typifying P. 845 
canadensis colonies. We exclude all colony-observations lying outside of the night-census range, and a small 846 
number of colony observations with fewer than 10 (2-to-6 state) larvae. These steps focus the payoff model 847 
onto a core dataset of 471 colony observations on 85 colonies, comprising 123,116 observed brood 848 
transitions (from the total dataset of 168,811 observed brood transitions on 1,027 colony observations on 849 
91 colonies). The model parameters were estimated using a Bayesian approach computed using Markov 850 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation in JAGS (using rJAGS58 in R). We confirmed MCMC convergence 851 
using potential scale reduction factors (PSRF; ?̂?) for five chains (?̂? < 1.1 for the large majority of 852 
parameters). After an adaptation phase of 5,000 iterations and a burn-in of 1,000 iterations, we sampled 853 
parameter slope values for 15,000 iterations with a thinning of 4. For the posterior predictive model 854 
(described below) to generate the inference about payoff rates using simulated input values for colony 855 
worker and brood numbers, we continued running MCMC sampling for a further 10,000 iterations with a 856 
thinning of 10. 857 
4.2 Within and between effects 858 
We use a ‘within-between’ formulation59, which follows the ‘de-meaning’ procedure suggested by 859 
Mundlak60. We split each time-varying predictor (i.e., predictors whose values can differ between different 860 
colony-observations within the same colony) into a ‘between-colony’ component and a ‘within-colony’ 861 
component. The between-colony component is the mean value ?̅?𝐶 of the relevant predictor for the focal 862 
colony 𝐶 (across its colony-observations). The within-colony component is the deviation from this mean 863 
in any one colony-observation.  864 
We denote the slope dealing with a between-colony component with the subscript ‘b’ (e.g., 𝛽𝑖𝑗,workers|b) 865 
and the slope dealing with a within-colony component with the subscript ‘w’ (e.g., 𝛽𝑖𝑗,workers|w). We also 866 
permit 𝑥workers to interact with the two other predictors: 𝛽𝑖𝑗,empty,workers denotes an interaction between 867 
𝑥empty and 𝑥workers, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗,ratio,workers denotes an interaction between 𝑥ratio and 𝑥workers. We allow 868 
these interactions at both the between-colony and within-colony levels. The random intercept for the 869 
transition 𝑖 → 𝑗 for colony 𝐶 is 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝐶. Thus, the fully saturated model for the transition from state 𝑖 to state 870 
𝑗 (subject to pruning of variables during the indicator-variable-selection process detailed in the next section) 871 
is:  872 
ln(𝜙𝑖→(𝑗≠𝑖)) = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗,empty|w(𝑥empty − ?̅?empty,𝐶) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗,empty|b?̅?empty,𝐶873 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,workers|w(𝑥workers − ?̅?workers,𝐶) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗,workers|b?̅?workers,𝐶874 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,ratio|w(𝑥ratio − ?̅?ratio,𝐶) + 𝛽𝑖𝑗,ratio|b?̅?ratio,𝐶875 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,empty,workers|w ((𝑥empty − ?̅?empty,𝐶)(𝑥workers − ?̅?workers,𝐶))876 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,empty,workers|b(?̅?empty,𝐶?̅?workers,𝐶)877 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,ratio,workers|w ((𝑥ratio − ?̅?ratio,𝐶)(𝑥workers − ?̅?workers,𝐶))878 
+ 𝛽𝑖𝑗,ratio,workers|b(?̅?ratio,𝐶 ?̅?workers,𝐶) 879 
(4.3) 880 
The random effect of colony ID is: 881 
𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝐶  ~ 𝒩 (0,
1
𝜏𝑖𝑗
) (4.4) 882 
where the precision 𝜏 is drawn from a gamma distribution: 883 
𝜏𝑖𝑗  ~ Gamma(0.001,0.001) (4.5) 884 
 885 
4.3 Model averaging 886 
In an indicator-variable-selection procedure, we construct the saturated model (Equation 4.3), and 887 
introduce a series of binary indicator variables that ‘switch on’ or ‘switch off’ each predictor throughout 888 
MCMC61. The duration of MCMC time with each coefficient switched on is proportional to the coefficient’s 889 
marginal likelihood of contribution. For each predictor 𝑝’s regression slope 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝 (within the vector 𝛃𝑖𝑗,𝑝 890 
in Equation 4.1), we can therefore annex a binary coefficient 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 that switches between 0 and 1, and then 891 
track the mean of the posterior distribution for 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝. The closer this mean is to 1, the more frequently the 892 
corresponding regression slope 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝 is retained in the model. 893 
For the random effects, we used independent Bernoulli priors for 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 to allow the MCMC sampler to 894 
turn the specific random effect on or off directly. For other predictors, we used a product of the 895 
independent priors for 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 and 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝62: 896 
𝑓(𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝|𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝) = 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝𝑓(𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝|𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 = 1) + (1 − 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝)𝑓(𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝|𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 = 0) (4.6) 897 
Following Ref.62, we used normal priors for the conditional distribution of 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝 given 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝. 898 
𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝 is indistinguishable from zero when 𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 switches the predictor off. We model the indicators as 899 
Bernoulli random variables with a 50:50 prior (𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑝 ~ Bernoulli(0.5)), representing our starting point of 900 
indifference between either including or dropping the slope 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑝. For interactions, we set a prior of 901 
Bernouilli(0.2). To accommodate the within-between formulation, we apply the indicator variables to the 902 
whole fixed effect predictor: the predictor cannot be turned on for one component (e.g., the between-903 
colony component) and switched off for the other component (e.g., the within-colony component). 904 
   The effects on the transition probabilities whose 95% credible intervals do not overlap zero are shown 905 
in Extended Data 3. 906 
 907 
4.4 Model checking: residual deviance 908 
The residual deviances 𝐷𝑖 for each multinomial model corresponding to the seven initial states 𝑖 are given 909 
by summing over the residual deviance contributions for each colony-observation 𝑘, where 𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the 910 
observed number of transitions from state 𝑖 to state 𝑗 for colony-observation 𝑘 and ?̂?𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the 911 









The deviance explained by the fixed effects is presented in Extended Data Fig. S6. 914 
In Extended Data 6–8, we plot residual deviance contributions for each colony-observation against 915 
predictors. There is no evidence of structure in the plots: most colony-observations fit relatively well, but 916 
some colony-observations exhibit very high deviance. In Supplementary Information Table S3, we 917 
provide the mean residual deviances for each of the seven starting state models (residual deviances divided 918 
by 471𝑛𝑖, where 𝑛𝑖 is the number of states into which a cell can transition from starting state 𝑖, and 471 919 
is the number of colony-observations. The models for starting states 1 and 6 have high mean residual 920 
deviances. Inspection of potential outlier colony-observations (colony-observations with unusually high 921 
residual deviance contributions) suggests that these high residual deviances may be partly reflective of 922 
episodes of unusually high mortality on colonies, with substantial death of large larvae (starting state 6) 923 
and substantial cannibalism of eggs (starting state 1). Future models focusing on predictors of severe 924 
mortality episodes and other on-colony dynamics may be required to reduce residual deviance in these 925 
scenarios.  926 
 927 
4.5 Expected time to adulthood 928 
To calculate the worker effect on the transition matrix, controlling for oviposition rate, we submit all 929 
estimated transition-to-death probabilities (𝜙𝑖→9 ∀ 𝑖) to the prediction matrices as transitions to new eggs. 930 
This isolates the potential effect of workers (as opposed to the egg-layer) to obtain per-cell efficiency 931 
without the confounding effect of variation between queens in the rate at which replacement eggs are laid 932 
following the death of larvae. 933 
The expected time to absorption (‘expected mean first passage time’ in Fig. 3a of the main text), in which 934 
a brood cell transitions from egg to adulthood (?̂?1→8) via intermediate states, can be obtained using the 935 
linear algebra for a discrete Markov process via the ‘fundamental matrix’ method of Kemeny and Snell57. 936 
Following Grinstead & Snell64, we obtain the fundamental matrix 𝐍 by inverting the matrix 𝐈t − 𝐐, where 937 
𝐈t is the identity matrix for the transient states and 𝐐 is a square matrix of transition probabilities between 938 
each transient brood state with length equal to the number of transient states (i.e., all states apart from 939 
adulthood and death). Accordingly: 940 
𝐍 = (𝐈t − 𝐐)
−1 (4.8) 941 
We solve for 𝐍 for each of the recorded iterations in MCMC separately, in order to sample the posterior 942 
predictive distribution using simulated colonies across the parameter space of worker and brood number, 943 
with the number of empty cells set to the population-average value. The element 𝑛𝑖,𝑗 in 𝐍 is the frequency 944 
with which the brood cell is expected to visit state 𝑗 given a current state 𝑖. The vector 𝐭 of times to 945 
absorption (using the values at any one recorded iteration of MCMC) is then: 946 
𝐭 = 𝐍𝟏 (4.9) 947 
where 𝟏 is a column vector of 1s. The 𝑖th element of 𝐭 is the duration (in step numbers) from state 𝑖 to 948 
successful production of a new adult. 949 
To obtain the 𝐈t − 𝐐 matrix within MCMC, we employ the between-colony effects, which provide a 950 
measure of the quantities of interest (workforce size and worker-to-brood ratio) that abstracts away 951 
extraneous between-colony variation (in the random intercepts terms 𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝐶) and within-colony variation 952 
that is likely to be confounded by colony ageing (in the within-colony effects). We then derive the predicted 953 
whole-colony rate of brood production by converting the per-cell time to absorption to a productivity rate 954 
per unit time and scaling this rate by the brood cohort size on each colony (using the total number of eggs 955 
to large larvae, states 1–6, a measure of cohort size). 956 
In the main text, we plot the expected mean first passage time in Fig. 3a and the estimated whole-colony 957 
productivity in Fig. 3c. 958 
 959 
4.6 Indirect fitness payoff calculation 960 
Extracting predictions at the population mean level of cell emptiness (Extended Data 9), we plot the 961 
posterior predictive distribution for whole-colony productivity using the 1,000 simulated points (in 962 
Mathematica). That is, to extract the shape of the posterior predictive distribution, we fit the smooth 963 
interpolation to 1,000 closely-packed samples monitored in MCMC.  964 
The diminishing returns hypothesis predicts that a worker can maximise inclusive fitness by shifting from 965 
a home colony 1 with worker-to-brood ratio 𝜓1 and brood number 𝑡1 (where she is related to the brood 966 
by 𝑟1) to a partner colony 2 with worker-to-brood ratio 𝜓2 and brood number 𝑡2 (where she is related to 967 














where she has a larger effect on the production rate 𝑤 of offspring-equivalents by changing 𝜓2 on 2 than 970 
she would have by changing 𝜓1 on 1. The end result of the Markov model is a model of these partial 971 
derivatives (estimates of the payoffs driving the benefit term in Hamilton’s rule) for colonies of different 972 
worker numbers and brood numbers (Fig. 3e in the main text). 973 
 974 
5. Individual-based simulation 975 
To simulate the spatial invasion of cooperative drifting under nonlinear returns to cooperation, we 976 
consider the evolution of a decision rule in a haplodiploid population on a square lattice in a spatially explicit 977 
individual-based simulation. Nodes represent colony sites. Each colony has a single monogamous 978 
reproductive pair of a diploid queen and haploid drone. We simulate a death–birth updating process: each 979 
time-step, 10% of nodes are selected, and their resident colonies die. A new colony at each updating node 980 
is then founded by a new queen drawn from within the dispersal range for females, with probabilities 981 
proportional to the payoffs of each of the surrounding eight colonies. We consider two discrete conditions 982 
for the female dispersal range: (1) female philopatry (local dispersal within the Moore neighbourhood [the 983 
surrounding eight nodes]); and (2) global female dispersal (dispersal from any distance on the lattice with 984 
equal probability). 985 
Drones are selected from anywhere in the lattice37, with probabilities proportional to the queen’s fitness 986 
at each colony on the lattice. Colonies produce female workers as they age: every three time-steps, they gain 987 
a unit of workers, until reaching a maximum number of units (set to 10 in the main text results; Fig. 4). 988 
Queen fitness 𝑤 (production of reproductively destined brood) is determined by: 989 
𝑤 = 1 − (1 − ℎ)𝑇 (5.1) 990 
where ℎ is the total worker effort received by the colony rescaled between 0 (no workers) and 1 (maximum 991 
number of workers possible). We consider two discrete conditions for diminishing returns: no diminishing 992 
returns (𝑇 = 1) and moderate diminishing returns (𝑇 = 3). 993 
Each worker has a finite amount of help to distribute. We consider selection on a single locus 𝑦, which is 994 
the probability of drifting by workers on colonies above a threshold worker number (5 in Fig. 4). Drifter 995 
help is distributed at random within each worker’s local helping window. We consider two discrete 996 
conditions for the size of the helping window: (1) workers help indiscriminately within the local Moore 997 
neighbourhood; (2) workers restrict the helping window only to colonies with immediate genealogical ties 998 
to the home colony (defined as the parent colony from which the mother queen came or a daughter colony 999 
on which a sister is queen). 1000 
  Main Text Fig. 4 summarises the role of local cooperation. 1001 
 1002 
Additional information 1003 
Additional detail on methods is provided in the Supplementary Information, and statistical and 1004 
simulation code is provided in the electronic material. Additional figures are provided in Extended Data.1005 
 1006 
